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TOUT DOIT CHANGER POUR QUE RIEN NE CHANGE1 
INTRODUCTION 
Much has changed since the summer of 1976—famously, the 
nation’s Bicentennial, but also the date of Wilkes v. Springside 
Nursing Home, Inc.,2 the focus of this Symposium.  In mid-2010, for 
example, South Africa was the site of a peaceful if exuberant World 
Cup Soccer tournament,3 whereas in mid-1976, South African po­
lice opened fire on crowds protesting the government’s harrowing 
apartheid policies.4  Unemployment stood at 7.7% in 19765—higher 
than usual, but not the August 2010, stubborn rate of 9.7%.6  The 
* Robert O. Bentley Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of 
Law; LeJeune Distinguished Chair in Law, University of St. Thomas (Minneapolis) 
School of Law.  The Frances Lewis Law Center at Washington and Lee University and 
the University of St. Thomas provided financial support. John Jacob, Archivist at 
Washington and Lee, provided extensive and invaluable archival assistance. Thomas 
Berg, Nathan Johnson, Jeffrey Kahn, and Ann Massie gave the author helpful 
information. 
1. This French saying means “Everything must change so that nothing changes.” 
This ironic historical maxim likely came from the French translation of the 1958 novel 
THE LEOPARD by Giuseppe Di Lampedusa in which the character Tancredit declares, 
“[s]i nouse voulons que tout resta tel que c’est, il faut que tout change.” GIUSEPPE DI 
LAMPEDUSA, THE  LEOPARD (Feltrinelli 1958).  It is less well-known than the phrase 
“Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose” (“The more things change, the more they 
stay the same.”). ALPHONSE KARR, LES GU ÊPES (1849).  As argued in this Article, it is 
equity’s remarkable adaptability that makes it so durable and well-suited to preserve 
within the corporation—under constantly changing circumstances—the ongoing pursuit 
of a just ordering. See infra Part IV. 
2. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 657 (Mass. 1976). 
3. George Vecsey, Celebrating South Africa and a Job Done Well, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 10, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/11/sports/soccer/11vecsey.html. 
4. Milton Nkosi, Soweto 1976: A Schoolboy’s Memories, BBC NEWS, http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5060278.stm (last updated June 13, 2006) (reciting the memories of Mr. 
Nkosi, who, as a young boy, witnessed the events). 
5. David S. Broder, Ford Asks $440 Billion Outlay, $47 Billion Deficit, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 18, 1977, at A1. 
6. Frank Ahrens, March Unemployment Unchanged at 9.7 Percent, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 2, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/02/AR201 
0040201040.html. 
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two-year Treasury note yielded 6.67%,7 not the August 2010 paltry 
0.56%.8  The Dow-Jones Industrial average hovered around 1,000 
in 1976,9 and in August of 2010 it flit around the 10,500 level.10 
Stalwart Eastman Kodak loomed large in the camera business, in­
troducing instant film photography in 1976; at times that year its 
stock traded at over $100 per share,11 but as of August 2010 it 
played a minor role in a much-altered digital industry, the stock 
trading, on light volume, at around $4 per share.12  And, on the 
international trade front, in 1976 the United States faced its great­
est trade competition from Japan and Germany,13 whereas now 
China is a more formidable economic rival.14 
In the cultural arena, Rocky was the top-grossing film in 
1976,15 with Toy Story 3 leading so far in 2010.16 Silly Love Songs 
by Wings was the biggest hit song in 1976,17 but California Gurls by 
7. Historical Data for the 2-Year Treasury Constant Maturities on an Annual Ba­
sis, FED. RESERVE, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data/Annual/H15_ 
TCMNOM_Y2.txt (last visited Nov. 19, 2010). 
8. Daily Treasury Yield Curve Rates, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, http://www. 
treas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/debt-management/interest-rate/yield.shtml (last vis­
ited Nov. 19, 2010).  This rate was as of August 27, 2010, the rate continues to fluctuate 
slightly on a daily basis. 
9. See Performance of Good Money & Dow Jones Industrial Averages (Since the 
End of 1976), GOODMONEY.COM, www.goodmoney.com/gmiaraw.htm (last updated 
Jan. 10, 2001) (showing the Dow Jones Industrial in 1976 at 1,004.65). 
10. Dow Jones Industrial Average, YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/q/ 
hp?s=^DJI&a=08&b=17&c=2010&d=08&e=17&f=2010&g=d (last visited Nov. 20, 
2010) (showing the historical price as of September 17, 2010). 
11. Vartanig G. Vartan, Eastman and Polaroid:  The Profit Outlook, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 20, 1976, at 68; see also Eastman Kodak Historical Prices, YAHOO! FINANCE, http:/ 
/finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=EK&a=00&b=1&c=1976&d=11&e=31&f=1976&g=d&z=66 
&y=198 (last visited Nov. 20, 2010). 
12. Dana Mattioli, Fresh Kodak Concerns Surface, WALL ST. J., July 29, 2010, at 
B5, available  at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487039409045753948924 
94087732.html. 
13. See Edwin L. Dale, Jr., $906 Million Deficit in November Trade Sets Record 
for U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1976. 
14. WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RESEARCH  SERV., RL 33536, CHINA-U.S. 
TRADE  ISSUES, at 1-3 (2009), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/ 
127016.pdf. 
15. Tim Dirks, All-Time Top Box Office Hits (domestic) By Decade and Year, 
FILMSITE, http://www.filmsite.org/boxoffice2.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2010). 
16. See id. (noting that Toy Story 3 has made the top ten list for the 2000’s); see 
also 2010 Yearly Box Office Results, BOX  OFFICE  MOJO, http://boxofficemojo.com/ 
yearly/chart/?yr=2010&p=.htm (last updated Nov. 13, 2010). 
17. The BillBoard Hot 100 Songs of the Year (1970-1979), BILLBOARD.COM, http:/ 
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Katy Perry featuring Snoop Dogg, leads the pack so far in 2010.18 
The top mid-70’s television show, All in the Family, is long gone,19 
and today the CSI franchise holds sway.20  Disco dancing has disap­
peared,21 and people now are “Dancing with the Stars.”22  Much 
else in the realms of politics, economics, medicine, law, and social-
cultural affairs also has changed over the years. 
But much has not changed since 1976. The death penalty— 
held by the U.S. Supreme Court not to violate the Eighth Amend­
ment in 197623—remains in force in a majority of states.24  Tom 
Watson was playing remarkable golf in 1976,25 and in 2010, at age 
60, he still is.26  Bobby Knight, who coached Indiana to an NCAA 
basketball championship in 1976,27 still offers acerbic if insightful 
commentary on the game.28  Movie actors Sylvester Stallone 
(Rocky—1976),29 Robert Redford (All the President’s Men— 
1976),30 Clint Eastwood (The Enforcer—1976),31 and Jack Nichol­
18. Hot 100, BILLBOARD.COM, http://www.billboard.com/charts/hot-100#/charts/ 
hot-100 (last visited Sept. 19, 2010). 
19. Top Ten 1970-1976, TVPARTY.COM, http://www.tvparty.com/70topten.html 
(last visited Nov. 21, 2010). 
20. CSI (franchise), WIKIPEDIA.ORG, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CSI_(franchise) 
(last modified Sept. 17, 2010). 
21. Gaynor Borade, History of Disco Dance, BUZZLE.COM, http://www.buzzle. 
com/articles/history-of-disco-dance.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2010). 
22. Gia Kourlas, Cheek to Cheek (and Tongue-In-Cheek), N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 
2010, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/20/arts/dance/20stars.html. 
23. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976); see also Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 
262, 276 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 247 (1976). 
24. See Facts About the Death Penalty, DEATHPENALTYINFO.ORG 1, www.death 
penaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf (last updated Nov. 10, 2010). 
25. Mr. Watson won the British Open in 1975 and 1977.  Brent Kelley, Tom Wat­
son, ABOUT.COM, http://golf.about.com/od/golfersmen/p/tom_watson.htm (last visited 
Sept. 19, 2010).  The Open is one of the four “major” tournaments in men’s golf. See id. 
He also later won the U. S. Open and the Masters, each of which is a “major” tourna­
ment. See id. 
26. For example, Mr. Watson lost in a playoff at the 2009 British Open Champi­
onship held in Turnberry Scotland. Id. It would have been his sixth Open victory. See 
id. 
27. Bob Knight: Former Indiana University Basketball Coach, INDYSTAR.COM, 
http://www2.indystar.com/library/factfiles/people/k/knight_bob/knight.html (last up­
dated Feb. 4, 2008). 
28. In Praise of Bobby Knight, STORMINGTHEFLOOR.NET, http://www.storming 
thefloor.net/2009/12/in-praise-of-bobby-knight.php (last visited Mar. 31, 2011). 
29. Sylvester Stallone, THE  INTERNET  MOVIE  DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com/ 
name/nm0000230 (last visited Nov. 13, 2010). 
30. Robert Redford, THE  INTERNET  MOVIE  DATABASE, http://imdb.com/name/ 
nm/0000602/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2010). 
31. Clint Eastwood, THE  INTERNET  MOVIE  DATABASE, http://imdb.com/name/ 
nm/0000142/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2010). 
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son (One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest—1976, Best Picture)32 all 
remain active in the movie industry. Musically, Elton John (Don’t 
Go Breaking My Heart—1976)33 and Paul Simon (50 Ways to Leave 
Your Lover and Still Crazy After All These Years—1976)34 remain 
on tour.  Steve Jobs co-founded Apple Computer in 1976 (on April 
Fools’ Day),35 and still regularly produces innovative products,36 
while Microsoft (trademarked in 1976 and led for decades by Bill 
Gates, who left Harvard in 1976 to go full time at the company he 
co-founded) remains a formidable force in the software world.37 
Many other high-profile features and people from 1976 also are still 
part of the social landscape today. 
This commemorative reflection on Wilkes will develop this 
theme of change/sameness in connection with equity—the source of 
the fiduciary duties which stood, as they often do in close corpora­
tions, as the centerpiece in Wilkes.  Equity’s role in the Western 
legal tradition began, of course, long before Wilkes, and it endures 
today in the law of close corporations precisely because, ironically, 
it is so adaptable.  Parts I, II, and III will sketch the larger milieu of 
the Wilkes case, where details about place, industry, and company 
are rich in their historic particulars but where too endless change is 
at work in the perennial quest for survival.  Part I describes the city, 
Pittsfield, Massachusetts where the focal point of litigation—Spr­
ingside Nursing Home, Inc. (Springside)—was located.  Part II tells 
a bit about the key industry in the case, nursing homes, from the 
early 1950s to the mid-1970s—the period spanning the company’s 
origins to the Supreme Court decision in Wilkes.  Part III highlights 
a few noteworthy, but little noted, facts about Springside itself. 
Part IV hones in on the dispute between Stanley Wilkes and his 
fellow shareholders in Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., and 
on how the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in resolving that 
dispute, re-fashioned the equitable concerns animating the 
32. Jack Nicoholson , WIKIPEDIA.ORG, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jack_nicholson 
(last modified Aug. 20, 2010). 
33. Elton John: Don’t Go Breaking My Heart, LAST.FM, http://www.last.fm/music/ 
Elton+John/_/Don’t+Go+Breaking+My+Heart (last visited Sept. 20, 2010). 
34. Paul Simon, PBS.ORG (Feb. 26, 2001), http://www.pbs.org/wnet/american 
masters/episodes/paul-simon/about-paul-simon/705/. 
35. Steve Wozniack, WIKIPEDIA.ORG, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steve_Wozniak 
(last modified Sept. 13, 2010). 
36. Apple, Inc., WIKIPEDIA.ORG, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple_Inc (last 
modified Sept. 19, 2010). 
37. Bill Gates, WIKIPEDIA.ORG, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bill_Gates (last mod­
ified Sept. 19, 2010). 
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landmark Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Company38 decision.  Part 
IV also places the Wilkes decision in a broader legal context— 
where it is seen as no aberration—and elaborates on how and why, 
in 2011, equity endures, by taking account of the inevitable flux in 
business relations in a way which static law does not.  Equity en­
dures even as it continually eludes law’s attempted subduing by 
rules, with the result that equity itself must still be endured by those 
involved in close corporations. 
I. THE PLACE 
Springside, a corporation formed under Massachusetts law, 
was located in Pittsfield, Massachusetts, the county seat of Berk­
shire County.39  Named after William Pitt, today the city’s popula­
tion of 42, 642 is down from the 51,974 of the 1980 census, and it is 
about back to where it stood in 1920.40  Due to the many streams 
flowing into the nearby Housatonic River, numerous lumber, pa­
per, and textile mills dotted the landscape around Pittsfield, and for 
a significant part of the 19th century, that “area [was] the center of 
woolen manufacturing in the United States.”41  Today, those indus­
tries are gone, and although Pittsfield’s economy still has some 
manufacturing enterprises,42 far more people are employed in edu­
cation and health services, leisure and hospitality, and in the public 
sector.43  The city also has been a place of residence for several fa­
mous writers, including Herman Melville, who wrote Moby Dick 
while living in Pittsfield;44 Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, Edith 
Wharton, and Oliver Wendell Holmes, whose family had vast land­
38. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975). 
39. Things to Do & Places to Stay in the Berkshires: Pittsfield, Mass. BERKSHIRE­
LINKS.COM, http://www.berkshirelinks.com/pittsfield-ma/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2011). 
40. U.S. DEP’T OF  COMMERCE  BUREAU OF THE  CENSUS, CHARACTERISTICS OF 
THE POPULATION: NUMBER OF INHABITANTS OF MASSACHUSETTS 23-10 (1980), availa­
ble at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/1980a_maABC-01.pdf; Pitts­
field, MA Profile, IDCIDE.COM, http://www.idcide.com/citydata/ma/pittsfield.htm (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2011); Pittsfield, Massachusetts, WIKIPEDIA.ORG, http://en.wikipedia. 
org/wiki/Pittsfield,_Massachusetts#NotableResidents (last visited Sept. 30, 2010). 
41. Id. 
42. See Pittsfield, Massachusetts (MA): Accommodation, Waste Management, 
Arts, Entertainment & Recreation, etc.—Economy and Business Data & Market Re­
search, CITY-DATA.COM, http://www.city-data.com/business/econ-Pittsfield-Massachu­
setts.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2010). 
43. See Economy at a Glance: Pittsfield, MA, BUREAU OF  LABOR  STATISTICS, 
http://www.bls.gov/eag/eag.ma_pittsfield_mn.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2010). 
44. Herman Melville and Arrowhead, BERKSHIRE  HISTORICAL  SOCIETY, http:// 
berkshirehistory.org/herman-melville/herman-melville-and-arrowhead/ (last visited 
Nov. 13, 2010). 
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holdings in Pittsfield and whose son, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 
served on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts for two de­
cades before becoming a Justice on the U.S. Supreme Court in 
1902.45 
Like the path-breaking legal duo of Donahue and Wilkes, 
Pittsfield itself is associated with several “firsts.” William Craig was 
the first Secret Service agent killed on a presidential protection de­
tail as he accompanied President Theodore Roosevelt on a trip to 
Pittsfield.46  Mr. Craig was thrown to the street when the barouche 
carrying President Roosevelt collided head-on with a trolley.47 
Roosevelt’s face was badly bruised, and ever the pugilist, he nearly 
came to blows with the trolley’s motorman, who later pled guilty to 
manslaughter.48  The first electric transformer was produced in 
Pittsfield by William Stanley, whose Electric Manufacturing Com­
pany was a forerunner to General Electric.49  In the first ever inter­
collegiate baseball game—held in Pittsfield in 1859 and played 
under the more wide-open, but soon-abandoned, “Massachusetts 
rules”—Amherst defeated Williams in twenty-five innings and by 
the astounding score of 73-32.50  In addition, Colonel John Brown 
of Pittsfield, was, during the Revolutionary War, the first to accuse 
Benedict Arnold of treachery;51 Pittsfield resident William Allen 
wrote An American Biographical and Historical Dictionary and was 
President of Dartmouth at the time of the famous Supreme Court 
45. Pittsfield, Massachusetts, WIKIPEDIA.ORG, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Pittsfield,_Massachusetts#NotableResidents (last visited Sept. 30, 2010).  Holmes, Jr. 
served as both an Associate Justice and, later, as the Chief Justice of the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court.  Michael A. Carrier, Note, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1894, 1902-03 
(1995) (reviewing G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND 
THE INNER SELF (1993)). 
46. Press Release, United States Secret Serv., United States Secret Serv. Honors 
First Operative Killed in The Line of Duty (Aug. 27, 2002), available at http://www. 
secretservice.gov/press/pub2002.pdf. 
47. Id. 
48. Clarence Fanto, Pittsfield: The City is on a Major Upswing Despite Recent 
Setbacks, THE BERKSHIRE EAGLE, June 5, 2007, http://www.berkshireeagle.com/search/ 
ci_6063023?IADID=search-www.berkshireeagle.com-www.be. 
49. History of Pittsfield, CITY OF PITTSFIELD, http://www.pittsfield-ma.org/about_ 
pittsfield/history_of_pittsfield.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2010). 
50. One hundred fiftieth anniversary of first college baseball game—Williams vs. 
Amherst to air LIVE on ESPN360 from Pittsfield’s Wahconah Park and on tape delay 




51. Robert L. French, Colonel John Brown 1744-1780, THREE  RIVERS (2003), 
http://www.fortklock.com/coloneljbrown.htm. 
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case;52 and department store magnate Marshall Field took his first 
paying job as an “errand boy” in Pittsfield.53 
With its stolid but interesting history, Pittsfield was an apt set­
ting for what surely started out as just another prosaic lawsuit, in­
volving a typical business dispute, which went on, nonetheless, to 
generate considerable, if niched, notoriety.  Unlike Pittsfield’s other 
encounters with famous firsts,54 the Wilkes ruling in 197655 may 
have gone unnoticed by, and may be still largely unknown to, the 
local populace—the case drew no comment in the Berkshire Eagle 
newspaper, much less the August Boston Globe56—even though its 
enduring influence may be far greater than those “firsts” elsewhere 
touted by Pittsfield’s boosters. 
II. THE INDUSTRY 
The four original partner-shareholders in Springside showed 
remarkable entrepreneurial vision, or enjoyed extremely good for­
tune, in entering the nursing home business in the early 1950s. The 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court opinion spends little time on 
this, observing only that, with respect to a certain real estate parcel, 
“the parties later determined that the property would have its 
greatest potential for profit if it were operated by them as a nursing 
home.”57  We see change in the parties’ thinking, it is obvious, from 
the very outset. 
The post-World War II period was a time of considerable 
growth in the nursing home business.58  This resulted from, among 
other factors, shifting cultural attitudes about proper care for the 
elderly and increased availability of federal payments for construc­
tion of nursing homes “in conjunction with existing facilities,” 
which were approved in the 1954 Medical Facilities Survey and 
Construction Act in an effort to improve the overall quality of elder 
52. Guide to the Papers of William Allen, 1800-1856, DARTMOUTH C. LIBR., http:/ 
/ead.dartmouth.edu/html/ms916_fullguide.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2011); see Trs. of 
Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 5184 (1819). 
53. Marshall Field, ENCYCLOPEDIA  BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EB 
checked/topic/206204/Marshall-Field (last visited Sept. 18, 2010). 
54. See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text. R 
55. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976). 
56. Electronic searches of the digitized Berkshire Eagle (through Ancestry.com) 
and the Boston Globe (via Factiva.com) produced no results. 
57. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 659. 
58. BRADFORD H. GRAY, FOR-PROFIT  ENTERPRISE IN  HEALTH  CARE 496-98 
(1986). 
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care.59  Passage of the Kerr-Mills Provisions in 1960, moreover, au­
thorized medical assistance payments to poorer residents of nursing 
homes,60 though many states did not participate in that voluntary 
program.61  Still, the real growth lay ahead, given that of all money 
appropriated by Congress for construction of various facilities in 
1954, only $4 million was allotted for nursing homes.62 
The real growth in the nursing home industry occurred in the 
1960s.63  Due to the availability of Medicare and Medicaid pay­
ments to nursing homes beginning in the mid-1960s, by the mid­
1970s the nursing home industry had experienced a dramatic up­
surge, with overall nursing home expenditures increasing 1,400% 
between 1960 and 1974.64  President Gerald Ford, in May 1976, 
even called for the observance of National Nursing Home Week.65 
Sixteen thousand homes were generating $4.7 billion in annual rev­
enue by the mid-70s.66  Three-quarters of the private nursing homes 
in the mid-1970s were operated on a for-profit basis, with approxi­
mately two-thirds of total industry revenue coming from govern­
ment sources.67  Moreover, by the mid-1970s, much of the industry 
was organized with the same separation between ownership and 
management as seen in other businesses,68 as larger care-providers 
increasingly were drawn to the attractive profit opportunities the 
industry offered.69  It was also during this high-growth period, how­
ever, and notwithstanding extensive regulation, that the nursing 
home industry was famously associated with chilling tales of patient 
neglect and abuse, corruption, and rampant Medicaid fraud.70  It 
59. Medical Facilities Survey and Construction Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-482, 
68 Stat. 461 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 291 to 291b, 291c, 291g, to 291j, 291m, 
291o to 291 o-1 (2006)). 
60. Act of Sept. 13, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-778, 74 Stat. 987 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 301, 302 (2006)). 
61. JAMES MIDGLEY & MICHELLE LIVERMORE, THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL POL­
ICY 384-85 (2d ed. Sage Publications, Inc. 2009). 
62. Tabulation Made of Nursing Homes, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1955, at 78. 
63. GRAY, supra note 58, at 497. R 
64. David Shulman & Ruth Galanter, Reorganizing the Nursing Home Industry: 
A Proposal, 54 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND. Q. 129, 130 (1976). 
65. Gerald Ford, Message on the Observance of National Nursing Home Week, 
THE  AM. PRESIDENCY  PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid= 
5993 (last visited Sept. 18, 2010). 
66. Shulman & Galanter, supra note 64, at 130. R 
67. Id. at 130-31. 
68. Id. at 130. 
69. Id. 
70. Nursing Home Report: Things Are Still Bad, N. Y. TIMES, May 23, 1976, at E5; 
Nursing-Home Head Is Indicted In Fraud, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1976, at 98. 
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should be emphasized, however, that nothing in the Wilkes opinion 
suggests that the Springside Nursing Home was afflicted with these 
problems. 
The industry was quite capital intensive, not because of large 
expenditures for capital equipment, but due to extensive invest­
ment in improved real estate.71  This investment was encouraged by 
government reimbursement formulas, which included a percentage 
return on invested capital.72  For example, a 1976 study of the nurs­
ing home industry drawing on data obtained from public company 
reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, reveals 
that due to large depreciation charges affording tax shelters, a typi­
cal nursing home bed yielded an enviable 29% rate of cash flow 
return on investment.73 
Mr. Wilkes, with a judicially-noticed reputation for profitable 
dealings in real estate,74 would have clearly understood deprecia­
tion charges, tax shelters, and cash flow. Financially, the nursing 
home business generated a steady, government-provided revenue 
stream; government-sanctioned depreciation charges; and high, de­
pendable cash flow returns, all in a stable growth industry.75  For 
any shareholder to abruptly lose a longstanding stream of income 
from any corporation is a financial setback. For a real estate and 
cash-flow-savvy investor like Wilkes, it altered fundamentally the 
very raison d’être for investing in a nursing home company like Spr­
ingside in the first place. 
III. THE CORPORATION 
In 1951, Mr. Wilkes acquired an option to purchase a lot and 
building on the corner of Springside Avenue and North Street in 
Pittsfield.76  The property had previously housed the Hillcrest Hos­
71. Shulman & Galanter, supra note 64, at 134. R 
72. Id. at 137. 
73. Id. 
74. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 659 (Mass. 1976). 
Mr. Wilkes apparently continued to invest in Pittsfield real estate even after he became 
involved in Springside. See Wilkes Buys Berkshire City Land at Auction, THE  BERK­
SHIRE EAGLE, Aug. 13, 1965, at 15. 
75. See 4 ALAN M. GARBER, FRONTIERS IN HEALTH POLICY RESEARCH 78 (The 
MIT Press 2001) (“In 1960, public expenditure on long-term care in the United States 
accounted for only 2 percent of health care spending, but in 1996 it accounted for 10 
percent.”). 
76. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 659. 
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pital.77  Mr. Wilkes was said to be “principally engaged in the roof­
ing and siding business” but he also had a local reputation for 
“profitable dealings in real estate.”78  To be accurate, Mr. Wilkes 
had started his roofing business in 1939, when he was thirty-three 
years old, and in 1972, when he was sixty-six, he sold it and went 
into the siding business.79  He was forty-five when he bought the 
Springside Avenue option in 1951.80  Wilkes brought in three other 
investors—Riche, Quinn, and Pipkin—and the four of them ini­
tially purchased the building and lot “as a real estate investment 
which, they believed, had good profit potential on resale or 
rental.”81  Initially, Wilkes may have seen this as yet another oppor­
tunity for his “profitable dealings in real estate.”82 
Later the four men decided “the property would have its great­
est potential for profit . . . as a nursing home.”83  Whether visionary 
or simply fortunate, in retrospect this was a wise move, given how 
rapidly the nursing home industry grew in the 1950s and, especially, 
in the 1960s.84  The decision to operate a nursing home on the lot 
the four gentlemen acquired must have happened fairly quickly be­
cause a Berkshire Eagle newspaper article reports that Springside 
opened its first nursing home in October 1951,85 the same year the 
property was purchased.86  Springside opened a second home in 
late 1952 and a third home in February of 1957, when it bought and 
renovated property previously owned by the Pittsfield Anti-Tuber­
culosis Association.87  The third home had especially impressive 
and up-to-date fire-alarm, sprinkler, and back-up power systems.88 
Once the third home had opened, the company reportedly was the 
largest privately-owned nursing home operator in Massachusetts.89 
The Wilkes opinion reports that Wilkes consulted his attorney 
about the new business, and that his attorney suggested they form a 
77. Open House Tomorrow at Nursing Home, THE  BERKSHIRE  EAGLE, Feb. 9, 
1957, at 6. 
78. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 659. 
79. Obituary, Stanley J. Wilkes, Ex-President of Berkshire Roofing, BERKSHIRE 
EAGLE, Apr. 30, 1981, at 17. 
80. Id. 
81. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 659. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. See supra Part II. 
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corporation rather than a partnership, largely to avoid personal lia­
bility for business debts.90  The other three investors concurred.91  It 
appears, however, that the business was operated for at least some 
period as a partnership prior to being incorporated, a fact that 
would shape Wilkes’s initial legal strategy.92  This background fact 
in Wilkes certainly confirms the observation made a year earlier in 
Donahue that many close corporations are, essentially, “little more 
than incorporated . . . partnerships.”93 
The newly formed Massachusetts corporation, Springside 
Nursing Home, Inc., owned and operated all aspects of the nursing 
home business, and each of the four men became a twenty-five per­
cent shareholder.94  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
opinion emphasized that certain original “understandings” existed 
among the parties,95 but, apparently, Wilkes’s attorney did not ad­
vocate a written shareholders’ agreement to protect his client or 
any of the other shareholders.96  Consequently, the parties evi­
dently relied on these spoken but unmemorialized understandings. 
This may reveal poor legal counsel, or client naı̈veté, but it also 
indicates a certain level of trust; this trust was understandable on 
Wilkes’s part given that all three co-investors already were known 
to him at the time of the investment and were described by the 
court as his acquaintances.97  This background fact likewise con­
firms the insightful observation in Donahue that, in close corpora­
tions, the participants necessarily “rely on the fidelity and abilities 
of those stockholders who hold office.”98 
The mutual understandings of the participants in Wilkes were 
straightforward and quite typical of those arising from a close cor­
poration.  Each shareholder would be a director, would actively 
participate in management and decision-making concerning com­
pany operations, and “each would [, in turn,] receive money from 
the corporation in equal amounts.”99  No federal income tax “S” 
election, permitting avoidance of tax at the corporate level, was in 
effect.  Thus, salaries reduced corporate income subject to taxation. 
90. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 659 (Mass. 1976). 
91. Id. 
92. See id. 
93. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 512 (Mass. 1975). 
94. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 659-60. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 659. 
97. Id. 
98. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 512. 
99. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 660. 
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Wilkes, also by understanding, served as treasurer of the business 
from 1951 until 1967.100  And so it went, as planned and under­
stood, for many years.  By 1955, only the fourth full year of opera­
tion, each shareholder was receiving $100 per week, amounting to 
$5,200 per year.101  The median income for men in the United 
States in 1955 was only $3,400 per year.102  And only 23.7% of all 
men earned over $5,000 per year.103  Consequently, payments re­
ceived from the corporation alone—excluding all other sources of 
income—placed each Springside shareholder in the top quartile of 
all male wage earners in 1955. 
Moreover, it should be recalled that Wilkes was “principally 
engaged” in the roofing business.104  Thus, his non-primary business 
activity—the nursing home business—was providing him at age 
forty-nine with annual income more than 50% above the median 
level of income for all men in 1955. For some unexplained reason, 
the weekly payouts did not increase over the next twelve years but 
remained at $100 per week in 1967, the year trouble broke out.105 
Even in 1967, however, the mean income for all men was only 
about $8,100.106  Moreover, for people between the ages of 55 and 
64—Wilkes was 61 in 1967—the median income was only around 
$7,000.107  Thus, Wilkes’s non-primary business activity—the nurs­
ing home business—still was providing a very handsome financial 
return, on a relative basis, even though roofing was his chief occu­
pation, and even though corporate payouts had not increased for 
many years.  Furthermore, assuming the business was flourishing— 
and certainly the period from the mid-1950s through the 1960s was 
a profitable time for the nursing home industry generally—given 
the flat annual payout ratio and bright industry prospects with new 
Medicare and Medicaid payments, the value of the stock itself must 
have been appreciating considerably. 
It was Wilkes’s announcement in early 1967 of his intention to 
sell his stock that brought to the surface some simmering bad 
100. Id. at 660 n.9. 
101. Id. at 660. 
102. BUREAU OF THE  CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF  COMMERCE, CURRENT  POPULA­
TION REPORT—CONSUMER INCOME, SERIES P-60, No. 21 (May, 1956). 
103. Id. 
104. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. R 
105. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 661. 
106. BUREAU OF THE  CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF  COMMERCE, CURRENT  POPULA­
TION REPORTS—CONSUMER INCOME, SERIES P-60, No. 57 (Dec. 17, 1968). 
107. Id. 
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blood,108 and afforded the other investors an opportune way to put 
the “squeeze” on Wilkes.109 
The falling out among shareholders is well if tersely described 
in the Wilkes opinion.110  The upshot was that, just as Wilkes in 
early 1967 sought to exit and “cash out” of Springside after sixteen 
years, he was cut off by the other three director-investors from all 
salary payments and was removed as an employee, officer, and di­
rector.111  The discord had its origins in Wilkes’s insistence in 1965 
that co-shareholder Quinn pay a higher price for certain Springside 
property Quinn wished to purchase for himself.112  Wilkes’s fidelity 
to the corporation apparently annoyed Quinn and led to a deterio­
ration in their relationship.113  Eventually, two intra-corporate fac­
tions formed: Wilkes versus the other three investors.114  There 
were no allegations or findings of misconduct, neglect, or unwilling­
ness to work on Wilkes’s part.115  Wilkes, a minority shareholder, 
was being “frozen out” of the venture he initiated, a venture de­
signed—like his early real estate dealings and like all investments in 
the nursing home industry—to generate high, dependable cash 
flow.116  In fact, the manner of freezing out Wilkes was far more in 
line with the typical corporate freeze-out than the unequal purchase 
and sale of stock technique deployed in Donahue,117 oppressive as 
that technique was.  This was important in situating the Wilkes facts 
well within the ambit of customary concern in close corporations, a 
concern that was so expansively—perhaps too expansively—identi­
fied in Donahue.118 
IV. THE DECISION 
Although cut off from all corporate payments in early 1967, 
Wilkes did not start a lawsuit until August 1971, more than four 
108. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 660. 
109. Id. at 664 n.14 (the court drew the sensible inference of  a plan to squeeze 
Wilkes based on Mr. Connor’s “offer to purchase Wilkes’s [stock] for a price Connor 
. . . would not have accepted for his own shares”). 
110. Id. at 660-61. 
111. Id. at 661. 
112. Id. at 660. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 660-61. 
115. Id. at 661. 
116. Id.  For an apt definition of a “freeze out,” see Donahue v. Rodd Elec­
trotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 513-515 (Mass. 1975). 
117. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 661; Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 513-14. 
118. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 513-15. 
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years later.119  In the author’s experience, this delay is not uncom­
mon, as a disgruntled shareholder often tries and expects (or hopes) 
to reach an acceptable resolution before suing.  Moreover, it is only 
when the shareholder has been “cut off” for two or more years that 
one can truly conclude he has experienced a “pattern” of being shut 
out of corporate distributions. 
Wilkes engaged an out-of-town lawyer, James F. Egan, from 
Springfield, who later engaged another Springfield lawyer David J. 
Martel (Wilkes’s nephew), to assist in the appeal to the Supreme 
Judicial Court.120  He filed a “bill in equity” in Probate Court for 
Berkshire County and named as defendants the corporation itself, 
two of his fellow shareholders, and the executors of the deceased 
third shareholder.121  His initial theory for relief was breach of a 
1951 oral partnership agreement.122  Relying on a master’s report— 
which essentially found what Wilkes had alleged—the probate 
judge nonetheless dismissed the case in 1974,123 the year before the 
seminal Donahue decision.124  Interestingly, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted direct appellate review of the Wilkes dismissal in late 
1974,125 just before the Donahue decision itself, which was issued 
on May 2, 1975.126  Thus, as it deliberated over the Wilkes case, the 
court had Donahue fresh in its mind.  It seems unlikely that a direct 
appeal would be granted if the court saw the case as involving only 
a breach of partnership agreement, the theory below. Justice Wil­
kins’s very terse concurrence in Donahue was remarkably prescient 
in light of the Wilkes appeal because he refrained from joining in 
any implication in the majority opinion that the court’s reasoning 
“applies to all operations of the corporation as they affect minority 
stockholders.  That broader issue, which is apt to arise in connec­
119. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 658-59. 
120. Id. at 658. The author thanks Mr. Martel for describing when he got in­
volved in the litigation and his relationship to Mr. Wilkes.  David J. Martel, Esq., 
Speech at the Western New England College School of Law Business Symposium: Fidu­
ciary Duties in Closely Held Business 35 Years after Wilkes v. Springside Nursing 
Home, Inc. (Oct. 15, 2010). 
121. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 658-59. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 659. 
124. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 505 (Mass. 1975). 
125. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 659.  Under Rule 11 of the Massachusetts Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, direct appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court may be granted on 
the vote of two justices where, among other grounds, a question of first impression or a 
novel question of law is presented. MASS. R. APP. P. 11; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
211A, § 10 (2008). 
126. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 505. 
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tion with salaries and dividend policy, is not involved in this case. 
The analogy to partnerships may not be a complete one.”127  It was 
more than “apt” to arise; it had already arisen, and would soon be 
before the court, in the Wilkes appeal.  Sense can be made of this 
concurrence when one sees that, for some reason, Justice Wilkins 
did not subsequently participate in the Wilkes opinion—although 
he was still on the court—and thus his concurrence in Donahue ap­
parently was his only opportunity to express at least some misgiv­
ings about how to resolve the upcoming Wilkes appeal in light of 
Donahue. 
Having taken the Wilkes appeal in October 1974, the court did 
not rule until August 1976,128 suggesting the court was struggling to 
craft its ruling. Donahue was also slow to be decided, taking four­
teen months after the ruling in the appeals court.129  Moreover, on 
appeal, and in light of the fact that Donahue had been decided 
since Wilkes had taken his appeal, Wilkes added a claim for breach 
of fiduciary duty owed him by the majority shareholders.130  The 
court permitted the additional theory, a deviation from standard 
appellate practice, but understandable in light of the intervening 
and momentous decision in Donahue.131 The court—now led by a 
new Chief Justice (Hennessey), former Chief Justice Tauro having 
retired after Donahue132—made short shrift of Justice Wilkins’s 
hesitancy in his Donahue concurrence to automatically apply part­
nership law analogies in all close corporation settings.133  The court 
concluded that it was not vital to its decision whether Wilkes’s claim 
was governed by partnership law or corporate law because Dona-
hue had held that shareholders in close corporations owe one an­
other substantially the same duties partners owe each other.134  The 
Wilkes court, in other words, was not carving back the Donahue 
partnership analogy—the court described the factual differences 
127. Id. at 521 (Wilkins, J. concurring). 
128. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 657. 
129. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 307 N.E.2d 8, 8-9 (Mass. App. Ct. 1974), 
rev’d, 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).  The appeals court affirmed the trial court’s dismis­
sal of Donahue’s claim on February 20, 1974. Id.  The Supreme Judicial Court decision 
came down on May 2, 1975. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 505. 
130. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 659. 
131. Id. 
132. Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court, SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MAS­
SACHUSETTS, http://www.massreports.com/justices/alljustices.aspx (last visited Apr. 23, 
2011). 
133. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 662-63. 
134. Id. at 662. 
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between the two cases as “more of form than of substance”135— 
though it did, as is well-known, reconfigure Donahue in another 
key fashion described below. 
Wilkes, because he had never been “principally” employed by 
Springside,136 was not the typical shareholder-employee who, in be­
ing terminated as an employee, loses his chief source of wage in­
come.  Thus, the court could not, with respect to Wilkes, over­
emphasize the “job guarantee” or employment aspect of a minority 
shareholder’s investment in a close corporation.137  Instead, the 
court, besides mentioning Wilkes’s loss of “participation in the 
management of the enterprise,”138 shrewdly and neutrally phrased 
a longstanding salary payment to Wilkes as being “the principal re­
turn on his investment” and its curtailment as denying Wilkes “an 
equal return on his investment.”139  That perceptively hit the finan­
cial nail on the head for Wilkes himself, specifically, as an inveter­
ate real estate investor and for investors generally in the nursing 
home industry, where, as noted earlier, regular cash flow is a chief 
investment goal.140 
The larger human narrative in the Wilkes opinion was one of 
betrayal and dashed expectations among longtime colleagues. This 
theme played out in the usual way in a close corporation after “bad 
blood” between Wilkes and Quinn grew into majority and minority 
factionalism.141  Although none of the parties is fully sketched in 
the opinion, Wilkes is fleshed out in somewhat fuller humanity than 
are the defendants.142  As to the defendants, relatively little is said, 
with more attention given to their role as—controlling sharehold­
ers—in the morality play of corporate dissension and the specific 
actions they took in that role.143  Even in that archetypal capacity, 
neither the defendants nor the court had much to say in their 
defense. 
In keeping with the tenor of the times, the Wilkes opinion was 
doctrinal, though it drew heavily on scholarship detailing the plight 
135. Id. at 663. 
136. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. R 
137. See Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663. 
138. Id. at 662. 
139. Id. at 662-63.  These were Wilkes’s “reasonable expectations.” Brodie v. Jor­
dan, 857 N.E.2d 1076, 1079 (Mass. 2006); Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 662-63. 
140. See supra notes 73-75, 115-118 and accompanying text. R 
141. See Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 660-61. 
142. See id. 
143. See id. at 663-64. 
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of a minority shareholder.144  There was no evident “law and eco­
nomics” influence on the opinion—landmark works in that vein by 
Guido Calabresi and Richard Posner were very recent145—and cor­
porate law itself was several years away from being systematically 
examined from an economics perspective.146  The opinion also was 
not empirical or multidisciplinary in orientation. 
The enduring and memorable heart of Wilkes, of course, is the 
way in which it sought to rein in a potentially over-broad reading of 
Donahue’s imposition of partnership-like fiduciary duties on con­
trolling shareholders.  The court stressed the need for a “balanced” 
approach to the legitimate control rights of the majority, on the one 
hand, with the rightful concerns of the minority, on the other 
hand.147  Balancing, of course, is a longstanding mainstay of consti­
tutional law analysis, where competing interests are weighed 
against each other and the relative strengths of each are assessed.148 
Its use can be seen, for example, in dormant commerce clause anal­
ysis,149 due process review,150 outlining abortion rights,151 and in 
evaluating (and upholding) a law criminalizing the distribution of 
child pornography.152  All of these knotty issues—and others like 
them—require courts to measure the rival interests and determine 
which, on balance, carries the greater weight. The Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court itself had used a balancing approach in con­
144. Id. at 663.  This theme is developed more fully in the articles for this sympo­
sium by Professors Loewenstein and Thompson. See Mark J. Loewenstein, Wilkes v. 
Springside Nursing Home, Inc.: A Historical Perspective, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 339 
(2011); Robert B. Thompson, Allocating the Roles for Contracts and Judges in the 
Closely Held Firm, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 369 (2011). 
145. See, RICHARD  POSNER, THE  ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS OF  LAW (1973); GUIDO 
CALABRESI, THE  COST OF  ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND  ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS (1970). 
Michael Jensen’s and William Meckling’s pathbreaking work on a theory of the firm 
appeared in 1976.  Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Man­
agerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
146. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control 
Transactions, 91 YALE L. J. 698 (1982) (analysis of the economic benefits of freezing 
out a shareholder in a closely held corporation); Daniel R. Fischel, The Law and Eco­
nomics of Dividend Policy, 67 VA. L. REV. 699 (1981) (critique of an analysis of the 
effect of dividends on share prices). 
147. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663. 
148. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in an Age of Balancing, 96 
YALE L. J. 943, 943-44 (1987). 
149. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 143 (1970). 
150. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). 
151. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154-57 (1973). 
152. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756 (1982). 
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stitutional law cases before Wilkes.153  Thus, as a decision-making 
methodology, the Wilkes approach was drawing on deep and estab­
lished precedent. 
Wilkes’s balancing approach was fitting, but paradoxical.  In 
constitutional law the pivotal issue in balancing is how to reconcile 
individual rights with governmental interests, the latter typically be­
ing embodied in legislatively-enacted, majority-supported stat­
utes.154  Indeed, the first ten amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution—the Bill of Rights—and their subsequent incorpora­
tion via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, are 
designed to protect individual interests against the lawfully-exer­
cised power of a political majority.155  The Donahue opinion, by 
analogy, struck a protective “bill of rights” blow for minority inter­
ests in close corporations gave little heed to the rightful claims of 
the majority interests acting in accordance with the corporate stat­
ute’s “constitutional” power structure.156 Wilkes sought to restore 
the potential imbalance of Donahue by acknowledging the “selfish 
ownership” rights of the controlling group.157  Rather than the 
usual constitutional law concern for the individual in relation to the 
potentially tyrannical majority, therefore, Wilkes set forth a “re­
verse bill of rights” to recognize the legitimate concerns and prerog­
atives of the duly-constituted majority. 
Such a case-by-case balancing approach inevitably is messy, 
context specific, and often lacking in ex ante predictability.158  In 
the constitutional law area, balancing has been severely criticized 
for just these reasons, as well as for the broad discretion it accords 
judges.159  Consequently, in the governance of a close corporation, 
as in a constitutionally-democratic government, frequently there 
153. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Horne, 291 N.E.2d 629 (Mass. 1973); Common­
wealth v. Thomas, 233 N.E.2d 25 (Mass. 1967). 
154. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979); United States v. Rod­
riguez-Morales, 929 F.2d 780, 787 (1st Cir. 1991); Commonwealth v. Knapp, 804 N.E.2d 
885 (Mass. 2004). 
155. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3021 (2010) (holding 
that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is fully applicable to the states 
by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
156. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 512-14 (Mass. 1975). 
157. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976). 
158. Some balancing tests are not case-by-case but are more systemic in thrust. 
See Legal Theory Lexicon 024: Balancing Tests, LEGAL  THEORY  LEXICON, http:// 
lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/02/legal_theory_le_1.html (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2011). 
159. See, e.g., Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 897 
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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arises an unavoidable and recurrent clash.  This clash is not just be­
tween minority expectations and majority prerogatives, but also 
over views as to how best, jurisprudentially, to address that clash. 
Some favor the case-by-case approach, notwithstanding its messy, 
time-consuming, and somewhat indeterminate nature, on the 
grounds that it promotes more finely-tailored overall fairness.160 
Others prefer a more categorical approach in which, in corporations 
at least, minority shareholders must self-help ex ante by private bar­
gaining or are left out in the cold when trouble erupts, because such 
an approach promotes greater certainty of outcome and somewhat 
disempowers the judiciary.161  This clash of positions presents a 
stark antinomy in which a true harmonization of views is, ulti­
mately, impossible to attain. 
Of course the jurisprudential vessel for “unsettling” corporate 
law and its statutorily-enacted majoritarian regime is equity.  Eq­
uity—and its offspring, fiduciary duties162—by their very nature 
subvert and destabilize law.163  The problem with legal precepts, 
identified so clearly by Aristotle, is their universality.164  Although 
generally the categorical nature of law is desirable, so that even­
handedness is attained, in some settings to apply a legal rule blindly 
will itself create a manifest injustice and it is equity’s essential func­
tion to prevent that.165  Delaware’s corporate jurisprudence long 
has recognized this role in numerous settings.166  For example, with 
respect to the improper use of statutory power to amend bylaws to 
160. See, e.g., Lyman Johnson, After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse In 
Corporate Law, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 41 (2002). 
161. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, supra note 146, at 700-703. R 
162. McMahon v. New Castle Assoc., 532 A.2d 601, 604 (Del. Ch. 1987) (“Chan­
cery takes jurisdiction over ‘fiduciary’ relationships because equity, not law, is the 
source of the right asserted.”). 
163. MARGARET  HALLIWELL, EQUITY & GOOD  CONSCIENCE  IN A CONTEMPO­
RARY CONTEXT 6 (1997) (“Fundamental misconceptions of equity abound, . . . because 
of a persistent refusal to acknowledge that equity is, by its very nature, subversive of the 
law.”). 
164. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 142 (Martin Ostwald trans., Bobbs-Mer­
rill Co., Inc., 1962).  “[E]very law is necessarily universal while there are some things 
which it is not possible to speak of rightly in any universal or general statement . . . [t]he 
law takes the generality of cases, being fully aware of the error thus involved.” Id. 
165. See HALLIWELL, supra note 163, at 6 (explaining that equity occasionally R 
“subverts” law to correct a potential injustice caused by law’s inherent universality). 
166. Davenport Servs., Inc. v. Five North Corp., No. 01L-04-101, 2003 WL 
21739066, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct., May 19, 2003) (“The Court of Chancery is a court of 
‘limited jurisdiction’ that decides matters in equity; its jurisdiction was first defined by 
the jurisdiction of the English High Court of Chancery in 1776.”); see also Prod. Res. 
Grp., L.L.C. v. NCT Grp., Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 801 (Del. Ch. 2009); Carney v. Preston, 
683 A.2d 47, n.4 (Del. Super. Ct. 2006). 
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-2\WNE203.txt unknown Seq: 20 27-SEP-11 8:41 
332 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:313 
thwart a minority shareholder in the landmark case of Schnell v. 
Chris Craft Industries, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court stated 
that “inequitable action does not become permissible simply be­
cause it is legally possible.”167  And Delaware courts also have held 
that otherwise lawful corporate contracts are invalid if entering 
them constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty.168  In other words, eq­
uity, in certain circumstances, routinely intervenes into law-comply­
ing arrangements to correct injustice by imposing fiduciary duties 
on a control person or group and by constraining an inequitable 
exercise of power.  Although equity usefully meliorates the poten­
tial unfairness of law’s categorical rules in this way, it can, nonethe­
less, seem disturbingly amorphous with no clearly-delineated limits. 
This was one of the post-Donahue concerns that required attention 
in Wilkes. 
The perennial temptation, of course, is for law, initially hob­
bled by equity, to counteract equity’s foray by turning its very inter­
ventions back into more orderly “rules of law.”  Aristotle cautioned 
against this understandable but faulty desire for an illusory cer­
tainty by stating: “The rule of the undefined must itself remain un­
defined also.”169  Along this line, Wilkes valiantly tried to corral 
somewhat the equitable forces unleashed in Donahue through Don­
ahue’s broad holding that shareholders in a close corporation owe 
one another a strict fiduciary duty of utmost good faith and loy­
alty.170  At the same time that Donahue articulated this broad duty, 
it went on in utter tension therewith to mandate a “rule of equal 
opportunity,”171 apparently not appreciating the inherent differ­
ences and functions between “standards” and “rules.”172 
Wilkes sought to cabin the broad duty laid out in Donahue— 
without also reverting to the trap of “rule talk”—through a struc­
tured four-step framework.173  First, the plaintiff minority-share­
167. Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971). 
168. In re Paramount Commc’ns Inc. S’holders’ Litigation, 637 A.2d 34, 51 (Del. 
1993). 
169. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 164. R 
170. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 661-62 (Mass. 
1976); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 517-18 (Mass. 1975). 
171. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 519 (emphasis added).  An early comment on Don­
ahue noted what the author called “a rule of equality in the stock purchase area.” 
Michael B. Elefante, Corporations, 23 ANN. SURV. MASS. L. 264, 269 (1976). 
172. For a contrasting of standards and rules in corporate law, see Lyman P. Q. 
Johnson & Mark A. Sides, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary Duties, 30 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 1149, 1194-95 (2004). See generally, Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus 
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992). 
173. See Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663 (describing the four-step framework). 
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holder has an initial burden to plead a breach of fiduciary duty.174 
Second, the defendant control group then must demonstrate a legit­
imate business purpose.175  Third, the plaintiff must prove that the 
same objective could have been achieved by an alternative course 
less harmful to the minority.176  Finally, taking a balancing ap­
proach, the court weighs the strengths of the two sides and settles 
the dispute.177  This methodology seeks to bring order to the analyt­
ical and adjudicative process, but in the age-old law vs. equity tug of 
war it cannot—nor does it seek to—ultimately subdue the ever-un­
ruly equity by crafting universal “rules” of law.  In keeping with 
that approach, at the end of its opinion, the Wilkes court summed 
up that Mr. Wilkes—who, recall, had brought his suit as a bill in 
equity—was to be awarded such damages as a result of the “inequi­
table enrichment” of the majority.178 
The ongoing, but futile, Sisyphus-like effort in corporate law to 
counter the disruptive effects of equity by turning equity into the 
very rule-oriented approach it is designed to resist can be seen not 
just in Donahue but in other areas of corporate law. For example, 
self-dealing transactions by directors or controlling shareholders 
long have been closely scrutinized by courts.179  In an effort to bring 
a measure of legal predictability to these transactions, many 
states—including Massachusetts and Delaware—have enacted stat­
utes addressing director conflict of interest transactions.180  Yet, 
these statutes, in Delaware at least,181 and seemingly in Massachu­
setts as well,182 have been interpreted as permitting avoidance of a 
transaction’s voidability but not as preventing a court from review­
ing the matter ex post for compliance with fiduciary duties.  Equity 
will not altogether quit the field here. 
Even the seemingly awkward multi-step framework laid out in 





178. Id. at 665. 
179. See, e.g., Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590, 596-603 
(1921). 
180. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156 D, § 8.31 (2008); DEL. CODE  ANN. tit. 8, § 144 
(2001). 
181. See In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders’ Litigation, 879 A.2d 604, 614-15 
(Del. Ch. 2005). 
182. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156 D, § 8.31 preliminary note 1. 
183. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE  ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW, 246-51 (Harvard University Press 1991). 
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call, is to guide the equitable inquiry without vainly trying to reduce 
it to rule-like status.184  Such a methodology is not too dissimilar, 
for example, to Delaware’s approach in demand-excused derivative 
litigation.185  There, after a plaintiff-shareholder begins an action 
for breach of fiduciary duty, defendants may establish an indepen­
dent committee to investigate, and, if the committee members con­
clude the action is not in the company’s best interests, they may 
move to dismiss.186  However, the defendants must carry the bur­
den on certain issues, such as the committee’s independence and 
good faith.187  If they carry that burden, the court itself may weigh 
various factors and exercise its own judgment whether to dismiss 
the case or proceed to trial.188 
Also, in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., the Delaware Su­
preme Court likewise devised a framework of shifting burdens in 
fiduciary duty litigation.189  Beginning with a presumption of pro­
priety in director actions, the plaintiff-shareholder assumes the ini­
tial burden of providing evidence of a breach of duty, which, if 
proven, shifts to the director-defendants the burden of proving, to 
the court’s satisfaction, the entire fairness of director conduct.190 
And in the shareholder voting context, if the board acts in a way 
that thwarts a shareholder vote, neither the deferential business 
judgment rule nor a rule of per se invalidity is appropriate, but 
rather the defendants have the burden to provide a “compelling” 
corporate justification for the actions taken.191 
The Wilkes court mandated as one step in its framework that 
the controlling shareholders must “demonstrate a legitimate busi­
ness purpose” for its action—a burden they failed to carry in that 
case.192  This step likewise situates the case in a larger stream of 
decisional law designed to guide and constrain judicial review. 
“Business purpose,” for example, has long been required in the cor­
porate tax area,193 in the hostile takeover defensive measures 
184. See supra notes 162-163 and accompanying text. R 
185. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 (Del. 1981). 
186. Id. at 778. 
187. Id. at 788. 
188. Id. at 789. 
189. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 371 (Del. 1993). 
190. Id. at 361. 
191. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
192. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976). 
193. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935). 
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area,194 and in other cases where the court seeks to prohibit the 
majority from unilaterally “freezing out” minority shareholders.195 
These examples of multi-step frameworks and of requiring the 
business purpose element demonstrate the efforts of Delaware and 
other courts to do in a parallel way what the Wilkes court did: af­
firm the centrality of strict fiduciary duties among shareholders in a 
close corporation while bringing a principled sense of order and 
guidance to the law and equity tension so as to prevent one from 
vanquishing the other, while also avoiding the corresponding Dona-
hue misbelief that the two forces had somehow been harmonized 
into an easy-to-apply “rule.”  Concerns about Donahue led the Su­
preme Court of Delaware to reject it by reading it as just such a 
“rule-based” decision—without noting the subsequent tempering of 
Wilkes—which Delaware eschewed in favor of its customary “en­
tire fairness” test in a self-dealing context like that in Donahue.196 
Yet, in Wilkes itself, the Delaware approach would not have 
worked because the controlling shareholders did not themselves 
enter a self-dealing transaction with the company for which the “en­
tire fairness” test was designed.197  Rather, the controlling share­
holders caused the company to terminate the minority 
shareholder’s prior arrangement with the business.  Delaware’s 
more traditional doctrinal approach seems not to capture such be­
havior.  And the Supreme Judicial Court itself, in subsequent cases, 
has struggled to reconcile the broad fiduciary duty of Donahue with 
the employment-at-will doctrine in an effort to curb a corporate law 
incursion into the labor law area.198  No rule exists to make this 
accommodation easy. 
Law and equity will continue to subsist in an uneasy tension in 
our corporate legal system because each plays a vital role in the 
production of a healthy balance in that system.199  Indeed, there is a 
great irony thirty-five years after the Wilkes decision and its Dona­
194. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petrol. Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985). 
195. Schwartz v. Marien, 335 N.E.2d 334, 339 (N.Y. 1975). 
196. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993). 
197. See Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 660-61 (showing no mention of the controlling 
shareholders entering into a self-dealing transaction); Nixon, 625 A.2d at 1376 (explain­
ing the purpose of the “entire fairness” test). 
198. See Merola v. Exergen Corp., 668 N.E.2d 351, 354-55 (Mass. 1996); Blank v. 
Chelmsford Ob/Gyn, P.C., 649 N.E.2d 1102, 1105-06 (Mass. 1995).  Professor Deborah 
DeMott develops this theme more fully.  Deborah A. Demott, Investing In Work: 
Wilkes as an Employment Law Case, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 497 (2011). 
199. On the roles of law and equity in co-producing a healthy balance in corpo­
rate jurisprudence, see Lyman Johnson, Counter-Narrative in Corporate Law: Saints and 
Sinners, Apostles and Epistles, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 847. 
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hue-like drawing on partnership law to bolster fiduciary duties in 
the close corporation. Today, in partnerships—and also in LLCs, 
entities unknown in 1976—fiduciary duties supposedly may be con­
tractually eliminated altogether,200 while in corporations that is for­
bidden.201  Thus, while in 1975-76 Donahue and Wilkes creatively 
drew on partnership law to amplify the equitable voice in close cor­
porations, thirty-five years later that voice, although still remaining 
in the corporation, may, by contract, now be silenced altogether in 
Delaware partnerships and LLCs.202  In the initially more robust 
and protective non-corporate fiduciary duty area, law today in the 
leading business law state seeks to subdue equity, whereas in the 
close corporation arena law and equity remain, as always, at wary 
play.  In Massachusetts, by contrast, thirty-five years after Wilkes  a 
greater harmony between corporate and non-corporate business 
enterprises still endures.203 
CONCLUSION 
Much has changed since 1976.  The city of Pittsfield, Massachu­
setts has changed as it continues to adapt economically to a far dif­
ferent industrial-commercial environment than that in which it 
flourished for many years.  The nursing home industry continues to 
change as well, with the use of physical and chemical restraints— 
permitted in the mid-70s—now outlawed and the development of 
new procedures to ensure greater regulatory compliance.204  Spring-
side Nursing Home, Inc. also has changed—apparently it was dis­
solved long ago.  Yet, one of its former properties endures as a 39­
unit housing complex for homeless veterans,205 just as Springside 
Nursing Home itself had earlier converted a former tuberculosis 
200. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2008) (statute permitting elimina­
tion of fiduciary duties in Delaware limited liability companies); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, 
§ 15-103(f) (statute permitting elimination of fiduciary duties in Delaware general part­
nership).  Massachusetts appears not to permit elimination of fiduciary duties in part­
nerships or LLCs.  For a critique of Delaware’s waiver statutes on constitutional 
grounds, see Lyman Johnson, Delaware’s Non-Waivable Duties 91 B.U. L. REV. (forth­
coming 2011). 
201. Sutherland v. Sutherland, No. 2399-VCL, 2009 WL 857468, at *4 (Del. Ch. 
2009). 
202. See Johnson, supra note 200. R 
203. The Wilkes approach was applied by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court to LLCs in 2009.  Pointer v. Castellani, 918 N.E.2d 805 (Mass. 2009). 
204. CHARLES W. LIDZ, LYNN FISCHER, & ROBERT M. ARNOLD, THE EROSION 
IN LONG-TERM CARE 34 (1992). 
205. Veterans Group Gets $2.6 M Boost, THE BERKSHIRE EAGLE, Aug. 18, 2008 
(on file with author). 
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treatment center into a nursing home.206  Adaptation has occurred, 
for survival sake, in many venues associated with the Wilkes case. 
Fiduciary duties in the close corporation are an example of en­
during equity.  Shareholders in close corporations must “endure” 
equity in the sense that they must put up with it and, generally, 
cannot expel it a priori by means of statutes and private contracts. 
Equity in the close corporation also “endures” in the sense that it 
persists.  It persists because in many instances—Donahue and 
Wilkes being examples—it is needed to prevent lawfully-exercised 
power from unjustly harming a minority shareholder.  One key fea­
ture in its staying power, besides its usefulness, is its remarkable 
adaptability to the flux and “gray” of—and range of emotions af­
fecting—human relations within a business.  It opportunely takes 
account of time—and its passage—in a way timeless legal rules do 
not.  Law assumes both a highly rational world and one in which, 
while everything around it may change, a rule itself—once 
adopted—will be the same tomorrow as it was yesterday, no matter 
what else—even if much else—may have changed.207  In Donahue, 
hoary partnership law was equitably re-fashioned to the close cor­
poration setting and history was made.  In Wilkes, the very force 
unleashed in Donahue was itself molded yet again to give greater 
weight to the law-conferred privilege of control. Wilkes tethered 
equity and law together in a multi-step framework without purport­
ing to elegantly and forever solve the intractable law-equity quan­
dary.  The decision itself has endured. It has been cited countless 
times,208 appears in leading corporate law casebooks209  usually as a 
coda to Donahue—and probably is taught (or at least touched on) 
in most American law school corporations courses.210 
206. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. R 
207. As noted by Professor Robert Thompson, modern corporate statutes fre­
quently provide remedies—for example, corporate dissolution—in cases of “oppres­
sion.”  Thompson, supra note 144.  But those “law” provisions require that a R 
shareholder show oppression, which is conduct engaged in over time and is, essentially, 
an equitable concept. 
208. As of February 4, 2011, Wilkes had been cited 797 times. KEYCITE CITING 
REFERENCES: Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., Westlaw, www.westlaw.com 
(search for Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 and follow the 
“Citing References” link) (last visited Feb. 4, 2011). 
209. See, e.g., ALAN PALMITER & FRANK PARTNOY, CORPORATIONS A CONTEM­
PORARY  APPROACH 1044 (2010); ROBERT W. HAMILTON, ET AL, CORPORATIONS 363 
(2010). 
210. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Brodie v. Jordan and Wilkes v. Springside Nurs­
ing Home, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM, http://www.professorbainbridge.com/ 
professorbainbridgecom/2009/11/brodie-v-jordan-and-wilkes-v-springside-nursing­
home.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2010). 
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Equity’s unruly power to upend can be irksome to those who 
crave predictability and determinacy.  It remains essential, however, 
in a rules-based system where humility demands we admit that few 
rules are so sagely written that they will always avoid injustice if 
categorically applied.  Equity usefully permits the taking of a sec­
ond look, and, therefore, by nature it is more pliant and fluid than 
rigid precepts of law.  Equity’s very capacity to bring change means 
that nothing need change in our legal system’s ongoing pursuit of a 
just ordering within the close corporation. 
